The legislative effect of ignorance: institutional risk and the regulation of new genomic techniques

Recent innovations in biotechnology, above all the use of genome editing like CRISPR/Cas in plant breeding, have led authorities across the globe to question the adequacy of regulatory policies. Focusing on the situation in the European Union, this article claims that the inability to establish whether new genomic techniques (NGTs) were used in breeding a particular crop functions as the main driver behind the dawning policy changes concerning the use of NGTs in plant breeding. This ignorance takes the form of an institutional risk: as authorities are unable to execute the regulation, they are entering a regulatory impasse. Drawing a comparison to the writings of German sociologist Heinrich Popitz, who spoke of the ‘preventive effect of ignorance’, this article explores the ‘legislative effect of ignorance’ as the main driver of policy change in the NGT case and attempts to draw general conclusions for similar situations in science and innovation policy.